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Abstract 
Marriage, according to Martin Luther, is an institution both secular 
and sacred. It is secular because it is an order of this earthly life. 
But its institution goes back to the beginning of the human race and 
that makes marriage sacred, a divine and holy order. It does not – 
like the sacraments – nourish and strengthen faith or prepare 
people for the life to come; but it is a secular order in which people 
can prove faith and love, even though they are apt to fail without the 
help of the Word and the sacrament. The author applies this view of 
Luther in terms of two unacceptable extremes: the creation 
ordinances of Brunner and the analogy of relation of Barth. The 
dialectic of Law and Gospel should never be dispensed.  
 
Marriage is necessary as a remedy for lust, and through marriage God 
permits sexual intercourse. 
Similar is the allegory which Paul employs: that Adam and Eve, or 
marriage itself, is a type of Christ and the church. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When one studies the issue of marriage in the excellent electronic version of 
Martin Luther’s works, one sees that Luther used the lemmas, “marriage” or 
“matrimony”, no fewer than 1 991 times, spread over literally every one of the 
54 volumes! No wonder that Luther (LW 45:385)1 on occasion also wrote that 
his reflections on marriage kept him busier than any other theme in theology! 
One may also wish to add, tongue in cheek, that he gave quite a lot of 
                                                     
1 Since use is made throughout of the electronic version of Luther’s works (abbreviated as 
LW) and the 54 volumes were published collectively in 1999, the year of publication cannot be 
given in references, but the volume number, followed by the relevant page numbers. The 
electronic version does not indicate the page numbers in the case of Luther’s commentary on 
Biblical books. In such cases the references in this paper indicate only the number of the 
volume, followed by the relevant Biblical section. 
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attention to marriage for someone who was a dedicated priest and only at the 
age of forty-two was married for the first time!  
 On the Saturday night before Easter Sunday, 1523, a farmer who had 
come under the influence of Luther’s Reformation, arranged for twelve nuns to 
escape from the convent at Nimbschen by hiding them in herring barrels on a 
wagon (Lull 1999:129-139). Three of them returned to their families and the 
others all married later in Wittenberg, except for Katharina von Bora. Luther 
found lodging for her with Lukas and Barbara Cranach, a local painter and his 
wife, who were good friends of his. Katharina later showed signs that she 
would dearly like to marry Luther.2 He was initially reluctant because he had 
been excommunicated by the Pope and banned by the emperor, and 
therefore had a very uncertain future. Yet Luther did decide to marry and on 
Tuesday night, 13 June 1525, he became betrothed3 to Katharina von Bora 
and two weeks later, on 27 June 1525, his friend and minister, Johannes 
Bugenhagen, solemnised their marriage. Johannes Frederick of Saxony gave 
the Luthers as wedding gift the Black Convent (previously the Augustinian 
Convent) as a residence. Katharina immediately began a stud farm as well as 
a brewery, and at the same time began converting the convent into an inn for 
students and visitors, and even added clinic facilities to it. Six children were 
born of the marriage: Johannes (1526-?), Elizabeth (1527-1528), Magdalena 
(1529-1542), Martin Jr (1531-?), Paul (1533-?) and Margaretha (1534-1570). 
Moreover, they raised four foster children too.  
 The thesis I wish to argue in this article has as its point of departure the 
fact that Luther desacramentalised marriage and placed it squarely in the 
sphere of the world, but at the same time also added a referential meaning 
which placed it in a network of relationships – coram Deo et coram hominibus. 
It is therefore quite a difference to understand marriage not statically (an 
analogy of being), but in fact dynamically (an analogy of relation). An analogia 
entis is therefore exchanged in favour of an analogia relationis. This is an 
incredible contribution Luther made, not only to understanding marriage but 
also even to our understanding of reality! Through this he leads us as it were 
with a discourse in semiotics, past the being at hand to the inaccessible light 
of the transcendental. In the words of Martin Buber (1996), we could say that 
                                                     
2 The opinion has already been expressed that Luther married Katharina solely to illustrate his 
stance on marriage. But others turn this around and claim that he developed his ethics of 
marriage on the basis of his marriage to Katharina. These seem to be unjustified deductions. 
On the one hand, because his marriage had been solemnised at least 18 months after his 
new insights took place and on the other, because it was Katharina who insisted on a 
marriage to Luther. There is considerable evidence indicating that Luther did indeed love his 
wife (including LW 45:43; 49:117, 154).  
 
3 The tradition at that time determined that the betrothal was the actual beginning of the 
marriage. It was also consummated with sexual intercourse, which followed the betrothal (LW 
46:261). The solemnisation of the marriage that followed later, was its social dimension 
(Johnson 2005:127).  
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marriage ought not to be understood as an I-It matter, but as an I-Thou 
relationship. By using Augustine’s distinction between signs and things, an 
illustrative example can be given of how Luther understood marriage as a 
triadic relationship, with God as the reference point of meaning.  
 
2. ARCHEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE AS A SACRAMENT 
Timothy Lull (1999:140) states rather the obvious when he says that people 
should not only read about Luther, but also in particular read Luther himself. 
Both are essential. His compendium of 755 pages also offers a representative 
version of Luther’s most important primary writings (Lull 1989). However, the 
electronic Luther’s Works makes it possible to find virtually all the references 
to marriage – and especially particular word-combinations of it – in Luther’s 
oeuvre. The Biblical sections that Luther employs to gain a new understanding 
of marriage, are especially the following: Genesis (LW 1-8), Deuteronomy (LW 
9), Psalm 45 (LW 10), Isaiah (LW 17), Matthew (LW 21), John (LW 22), 
Romans (LW 25), Galatians (LW 26-27), l Corinthians 7 (LW 28) and l Peter 3 
(LW 30). Monographs and other genres about marriage are: The Babylonian 
Exile of the Church, 1520 (LW 36), The Estate of Marriage, 1522 (LW 45), a 
Commentary on l Corinthians 7, 1523 (LW 28), an Order for Marriage for 
Common Pastors, 1529 (LW 53), On Marriage Matters, 1530 (LW 46) and a 
couple of marriage sermons, 1519, 1529, 1545 (LW 44, 51).  
 It is clear that as regards tradition, Luther relied very heavily on 
Augustine’s theology. After all, he had not been a monk of the Augustinian 
order in vain! In the subject index of Luther’s Works one can clearly detect 
that this man from Africa is mentioned in virtually every volume. No wonder 
Luther called him a “fine man” and said that if Augustine had lived in his 
(Luther’s) time, he would definitely have stood by Augustine’s side (Van Oort 
1991:55). Van Oort even goes as far as asking whether the Reformation was 
not merely an “Augustinian réveil”! Luther wrote to his friend, Johannes Lang, 
on 18 May 1517 (LW 48:42) about Augustine’s importance for good theology: 
“Our theology and St. Augustine are progressing well, and with God’s help 
rule at our University ... Indeed no one can expect to have any students if he 
does not want to teach this theology, that is, lecture on the Bible or on St. 
Augustine or another teacher of ecclesiastical eminence.” 
There are also myriad examples of marriage, where Luther relies on 
Augustine. I wish to highlight two material examples. In his document, De 
Bono Conjugali (“On the good of marriage”), Augustine (in Roberts & 
Donaldson 1979c:3.32) writing in the year 401 on the basis of his 
understanding of the creation of man and woman according the book of 
Genesis, states that the value (bonum) of marriage is meant for procreation 
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(proles), fidelity (fides) and sacrament (sacramentum).4 The proles also 
neutralised the sinful desire; the fides also had to express the dimension of 
love; and the sacramentum was meant especially to ensure the permanence 
of marriage when two people vowed their fidelity to each other before God 
(Johnson 2005:125).  
Luther initially endorsed this Augustinian view. In his marriage sermon of 
1519 he still (for the last time) maintains all three of these aspects unabridged. 
Concerning marriage as a sacrament, he states: “In the same way the estate 
of marriage is a sacrament. It is an outward and spiritual sign of the greatest, 
holiest, worthiest, and noblest thing that has ever existed or ever will exist: the 
union of the divine and human natures in Christ” (LW 44:10). It is clear that at 
this stage, Luther understood the sacramental nature of marriage primarily in 
terms of its permanence. He would for example invariably be very reluctant to 
permit certain exceptions for divorce. Matters such as impotence, adultery and 
refusal of conjugal rights were the only reasons and then only in extreme 
cases (LW 15:558; 45:30; 46:310; 54:34). He could even on occasion have 
preferred bigamy to a divorce (LW 36:104). 
Augustine (in Roberts & Donaldson 1997a:26.50) furthermore 
distinguishes in the sacrament (which he regarded as especially, but not 
solely, baptism and Holy Communion) between the action (signum) on the 
one hand and the Divine grace (res) bound to it on the other hand. And this he 
linked in turn to Christ who came to full expression in the new covenant. The 
gulf between God and humans is therefore bridged by “sacred signs”. The 
best-known definition that Augustine consequently used for a sacrament, was 
that it expressed a “visible sign of invisible grace”. But to him it was also 
stronger than merely “express”. In fact it also brought about grace. It is indeed 
also correct to claim that Augustine invariably maintained this double meaning 
of the sacrament, namely a “significative-spiritual” as well as an “effective-
realistic” understanding (Kinder 1958:1322).  
Now Luther’s reaction to this is important. In his writing, The Babylonian 
Exile of the Church (1520), he questions for the first time the sacramental 
character of marriage. This entailed that Luther could clearly declericalise the 
Roman Catholic understanding of marriage. He points out that the Vulgate 
translated the 	
 of Ephesians 5:32 as sacramentum and that this 
contributed to the misunderstanding (LW 36:93). But his real argument is 
stated in his explanation of his Statements in 1521. It was not the mechanical 
working of the sacrament that brought salvation, but the faith accompanying it: 
                                                     
4 For a useful exposition of Augustine’s view of marriage, see Clark, A E (ed) 1996. St 
Augustine on marriage and sexuality. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press. 
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From all this, I think it is clear that faith is necessary for the 
sacrament, a faith which does not doubt that it receives everything 
which the words declare and the sacraments signify …This saying, 
taken from the teachings of St. Augustine, holds true, “Not the 





An argument he used was that we do not read anywhere in the Bible about a 
promise of salvation that is linked to marriage. Moreover, marriage was not 
instituted by Christ, nor is it a sign of something else. Although he invariably 
maintains the Augustinian distinction between signum and res, after 1520 he 
no longer applied it to marriage: 
 
We have said that in every sacrament there is a word of divine 
promise, to be believed by whoever receives the sign, and that the 
sign alone cannot be a sacrament. Nowhere do we read that the 
man who marries a wife receives any grace of God. There is not 
even a divinely instituted sign in marriage, nor do we read 
anywhere that marriage was instituted by God to be a sign of 
anything. To be sure, whatever takes place in a visible manner can 
be understood as a figure or allegory of something invisible. But 
figures or allegories are not sacraments, in the sense in which we 
use the term. 
(LW 36:92) 
 
It is important, however, to take into account that the concept of “sacrament” 
has undergone a particular Wirkungsgeschichte since Augustine. It is 
therefore correct instead to claim that Luther was dealing with an amalgam of 
Augustine’s opinion, scholastic theology and Canon Law. As far as marriage 
is concerned, we can call it a period of increasing sanctification, in terms of 
this period up to the Reformation. The two divergent approaches in the 
nineteenth century of the two monks, Radbertus and Ratramnus of the Corbie 
Monastery, still respectively maintained the double nature of Augustine’s 
legacy (Adam 1981:45). In the twelfth century, however, a third aspect came 
to the fore, in that besides the signum and the res, mention was also made of 
the forma (Kinder 1958:1323). (This was naturally following in the footsteps of 
Aristotle’s fourfold premise of causality.) The signum was now understood as 
the material element, the forma as the presence of God in the element and 
the res as the effective result that it held for human beings. Thomas Aquinas 
called these three aspects the mere signs (the sacramentum tantum), the 
compounding of two substances (the res et sacramentum) and its fruits for 
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those involved (the res tantum) (McGrath 2006:435-436). As regards to 
marriage, Aquinas hereby identified the forma of the sacrament with the fines 
as the corporeal intercourse between man and woman (Marsh 1958:320-321) 
and consequently explained procreation as the real reason for marriage. The 
sexual urge is then endured in terms of this purpose and limited room is also 
granted for it. In particular, Dominican theology rigorously maintained this 
ontological and undiluted understanding of the sacrament. This therefore 
brought about the meaning of the so-called mechanical accomplishment of 
salvation (ex opere operato). It means therefore that besides the element of 
“signification” as Augustine understood the sacrament, the elements of 
“transubstantiation” and “sanctification” were added. Therefore, in terms of 
this, the Council of Florence (1439) formally declared marriage a sacrament 
and the Council of Trent (1564) would later ratify this too. Through the ensuing 
centuries, the Roman Catholic Church persisted with these seven 
sacraments. The reason was probably because they kept on clinging to the 
conviction that the church, as institution of salvation, was the intercessor 
between God and humans (Adam 1981:56). 
 
3. LUTHER’S THEOLOGICAL PARADIGM 
Paul Althaus began his standard work at the time about the ethics of Martin 
Luther, by stating categorically that Luther’s entire ethics had been wholly 
determined by the centre of this theology, namely the justification of the sinner 
solely through faith in Jesus Christ (Althaus 1965:11). The theory of 
justification is therefore the indicator of the course and also the source of 
Christian ethics. Naturally, the implication is clear. Salvation cannot in any 
way be vested in the teleological fulfilment of ethics. Salvation is and remains 
purely and simply grace. Ethics is moreover aimed only at one’s neighbours. 
For this reason, all ethical acts towards one’s neighbours must be driven by 
the right relationship with God (Althaus 1965:15-16). Luther (LW 31:563) 
expresses this by seeing the First Commandment as the preconception of the 
Second Table. This makes all human conduct free and in terms of the 
justification, also holy before God. God’s love flows through us like a stream of 
water in a riverbed. But human beings must naturally first be redeemed so 
that they can perform this function.  
 This means that righteousness can never be the property of human 
beings either. It does not belong to us. It is alien to us, because it is Christ’s 
righteousness which is imputed to us. In his lectures during 1515-16 on the 
Epistle to the Romans, Luther became convinced that the classical 
understanding of righteousness was wrong (McGrath 2005:220). Now three 
important moments are important to his understanding. Firstly, that human 
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beings are passive in righteousness. Secondly, righteousness is possible 
solely because of God’s grace and thirdly, it is clear that human beings are 
capable of nothing good (LW 54:260-378). Faith is therefore always because 
of Christ and never because of faith. How people came to faith in the first 
place, was clearly a radically new point of view which Luther brought to the 
fore (McGrath 2005:221). Righteousness is now no longer to be understood in 
terms of God Himself, but in terms of what God does to the sinful person. This 
is expressed as a whole on the cross of Christ and our faith in it:  
 
Take note, therefore, of a new righteousness and a new definition 
of righteousness. For one usually says: “Righteousness is the virtue 
that renders to everyone his due.” Here it is stated that righteous-
ness is faith in Jesus Christ or the virtue by which one believes in 
Jesus Christ, as in Romans 10:10: “With the heart man believes 
unto righteousness”; that is, if anyone wants to be righteous, it is 
necessary for him to believe in Christ with his heart. 
 
(LW 27: Gl 2:21) 
 
This suddenly makes it clear that Luther increasingly broke away from the via 
moderna that wanted humankind to play a role in redemption. Consequently, 
righteousness is, on the basis of his theology of the cross, nothing other than 
a iustitia Christi aliena – in other words, an alien righteousness (LW 51:19). 
Since God declared that all of humankind was righteous (LW 35:371, 52:79, 
54:401), human beings are simultaneously righteous and sinners (inter alia 
LW 34:152, 41:111, 43:228, 51:16). With this, Luther deliberately digressed 
from Augustine’s Neoplatonism and grounded the flesh: spirit tension not 
anthropologically, but teleologically; a tension which can only be resolved 
eschatologically (LW 37:118). Now this implies that God declared human 
beings to be what they are supposed to be and they can live in creation as 
God intended them to live. Our vocation is therefore not to be without sin, but 
to control it: “We believe that the remission of all sins has been without doubt 
accomplished, but we daily act in the expectation of the total removal and 
annihilation of all sin. It is those who labor toward this who do good works” 
(LW 32:213).  
 Luther also reasoned against this background when he told three nuns 
in 1524 that the oath that they had sworn in their order, could be set aside and 
they could just leave the convent (Mennecke-Haustein 2002:430). Asceticism 
and celibacy fly in the face of God’s intention for creation. Luther had no liking 
for this Gnostic dualism of monasticism. 
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The revealed God governs the world in a double manner: the spiritual 
and the worldly kingdoms: “For this reason God has ordained two 
governments: the spiritual, by which the Holy Spirit produces Christians and 
righteous people under Christ; and the temporal, which restrains the un-
Christian and wicked so that – no thanks to them – they are obliged to keep 
still and to maintain an outward peace” (LW 45:91). These are as it were 
God’s right and left hands (LW 52:191). Luther applies this to ethics in 
particular (LW 45:88-93). This implies that God has two kinds of laws, namely 
the spiritual laws that teach righteousness and establish a spiritual kingdom 
where the faithful must live, and then again the worldly laws for those who 
cannot comply with the spiritual laws. Luther (LW 45:31) applies this to 
adultery, pursuant to Matthew 5:32, when he says that the faithful must not 
divorce, irrespective of adultery, but that the option of divorce does exist solely 
because of sin. These are also the vantage points from which one should look 
at marriage: from human beings (coram hominibus) and from God (coram 
Deo). Both these vantage points are essential (Lazareth 1994:237). 
 
Now in the law of Moses God established two types of govern-
ments; he gave two types of commandments. Some are spiritual, 
teaching righteousness in the sight of God, such as love and 
obedience; people who obeyed these commandments did not thrust 
away their wives and never made use of certificates of divorce, but 
tolerated and endured their wives’ conduct. Others are worldly, 
however, drawn up for the sake of those who do not live up to the 
spiritual commandments, in order to place a limit upon their 
misbehavior and prevent them from doing worse and acting wholly 
on the basis of their own maliciousness.  
(LW 45:31) 
 
It is immediately clear from this that Luther placed marriage squarely in 
creation and not in salvation. Therefore marriage is a matter of the Law and 
not of the Gospel. It is God’s bulwark against sin, and in no way a sanctifying 
means of grace. Although earthly and physical, marriage is nothing less than 
an ordinance of creation (inter alia LW 1: Gn 2:23). In fact, according to 
Luther, marriage is the most basic ordinance of God and both the other 
ordinances also rest on it (see Althaus 1965:91). Just as a man cannot be a 
man and just as a woman cannot be a woman, so too a man cannot live 
without a woman (but Luther does not reverse this phrase). It is the inherent 
nature of human beings to be in a relationship with the opposite sex (LW 
44:341, 45:390). We must not, however, see the three ordinances of God’s 
creation – marriage, church and State – neither too narrowly nor too statically 
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(Nestingen 2003:35-36). Marriage for example means the entire familial 
household, its maintenance too. Moreover the ordinances are also a dynamic 
matter. God as it were maintains his creation through marriage. So the church 
is an event and the State is a function. Therefore Luther places marriage, on 
the basis of his exegesis of Genesis 45:19, according to his classification of 
the Ten Commandments, also with the Fourth in addition to the Sixth. That is 
why the fundamental aim of marriage is also to conceive children and raise 
them in the ways of God (LW 44:11-12). 
For this reason, it is also possible for Luther to play marriage off 
against celibacy and to go so far as describing it as an even more important 
matter than celibacy (LW 28:19). l Corinthians 7:7 was at that time understood 
as Paul’s expression of a longing that everyone should be unmarried as he 
was and that according to verse 29, it is better to remain unmarried. Luther 
reads verse 7 differently, however, and in fact in the sense that everyone has 
received a particular gift from God – a few received the gift of abstinence and 
the majority received the gift of marriage. Marriage is therefore the “most 
religious state of all” because only this – and not celibacy – leads to a real 
inner Spiritual life (LW 28:17). Now this means that Luther has suddenly 
declared that the traditional monastic orders are secular because they merely 
offer ordinary physical care (LW 28:18). This is a revolutionary insight by 
Luther and can be compared with the “general priesthood” that was made 
accessible to all believers. The implication ought to be clear: in no way do 
ordinary folk (lay people) have a poorer spiritual relationship with God than the 
office-bearers do. 
 
4. THE ETHICAL APPEAL OF THIS PARADIGM 
Researchers into Luther’s understanding of marriage, such as Nestingen 
(2003) and Lazareth (1994), hold the view that for the theme in question, two 
matters in particular must be pertinently raised, namely marriage as a remedy 
against sin and marriage as the vocation of the believer. It is nevertheless a 
good idea to take note of the moral state of affairs at that time, before 
examining these two aspects. Hendrix (2000:170) points out that, in the 
sixteenth century in Europe, marriage and women were regarded as being at 
a precariously low level. Marriage was in a total state of decline. Luther 
himself expressed his displeasure about this. His fiercest attack against 
clerical promiscuity was perhaps in 1522 with his document, “Against the 
Falseness in the Spiritual Office of the Pope and Bishops”. The next set of 
random phrases from the work of Luther clearly indicate the moral crisis of his 
day (see Lazareth 1994:238-249):  
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• “What we would speak most of is the fact that the estate of marriage 
has universally fallen into such awful disrepute.” 
 
• “Finally, is it not lamentable that we Christians tolerate open and 
common brothels in our midst, when all of us are baptized unto 
chastity?” 
 
• “Erfurt has not been much better than a brothel and beer hall.” 
 
• “Especially do we call on the army chaplains to warn, correct, and 
threaten the soldiers, including the wild, tough, coarse mercenaries 
who are such experts in all sorts of profanity, swearing by God’s 
passion, by the wounds of Christ, by the French sickness5 …” 
 
• “There are many young men who feel that they are justified to take ‘one 
last fling’ before assuming the vow of sacerdotal celibacy.” 
 
• “Once you douse the lights, all women are the same.” 
 
• “If the wife refuses, let the maid come.” 
 
• “It is certainly a fact that he who refuses to marry must fall into 
immorality.” 
 
Luther explicitly states in contrast to this that marriage is to him a “clinic” or in 
other words a “remedy” against sin:  
 
But if you cannot avoid being joined to a woman without sinning, 
use the remedy shown by God. And if you do not seek the function 
of bringing children into being, at least seek the remedy against sin, 
in order that fornication and adultery may be avoided as well as 
pollutions and promiscuous lusts. 
 
(LW 5: Gen 28:3) 
 
He bases his ethics in this regard especially on the interpretation of l 
Corinthians 7 about which he states, besides his commentary on the Epistle 
to the Corinthians (1523), also in at least two separate documents (The Estate 
of Marriage [1522] and On Marital Issues [1530] that it should play a pertinent 
role. Against the background of the “alien righteousness” it means that human 
                                                     
5 The “French Disease” is syphilis.  
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beings still remain sinners, and must continuously fight against sin. Sin is then 
also not merely making the wrong choices, but a corrupted being. From God’s 
ordinances of creation alone, can the Christian now be free. Precisely in this 
lies the appeal of the Christian (LW 32:213). Luther (LW 51:378) deals 
extensively with the Sixth Commandment in his sermons about the Catechism 
(1528) and places a particularly high premium on a chaste lifestyle. When a 
man is about 20 years old and a girl 15 or 18 years, Luther (LW 45:48) states 
that they ought to marry. He says this against the background of a very 
realistic view of human sexuality (Lazareth 1994:248). He goes as far as 
saying, “It is certainly a fact that he who refuses to marry must fall into 
immorality. How could it be otherwise, since God has created man and 
woman to produce seed and to multiply?” (LW 45:45). 
 It appears that Luther gradually worked out a proper evangelical set of 
ethics about marriage. In The Estate of Marriage (1522) the foundation is laid 
for the declericalisation of marriage when its sacramental character is 
abolished and it is declared an ordinance of creation. It is in truth highly 
exceptional not to marry and is a gift granted to very few: “Such persons are 
rare, not one in a thousand, for they are a special miracle of God. No one 
should venture on such a life unless he be especially called by God” (LW 
45:21). In the years subsequent to this, Luther developed his marital ethics 
further by seeing it against the background of his theological paradigm as the 
fruit of the Spirit within the social orders. In other words, marriage is regarded 
as sacred again and it forms an important keystone in the whole of his 
theology. It is not only there to combat licentiousness but is in truth also 
instituted by God (according to Luther’s understanding, especially of Gn 45:19 
and l Cor 15:25). That is why it should be regarded not merely negatively 
(“remedy against sin”), but also positively as the “noblest and most precious 
work” (LW 45:46) and, even better, as the “most religious state of all” (LW 
28:17). As stated above, Luther repeated the triple aim of marriage that he 
derived from Augustine (fidelity, procreation and sacrament) for the last time 
in 1519 and speedily replaced it with fidelity – procreation – and love (Hendrix 
2004:172). For this reason, Lazareth (1994:256-257) is correct in asserting 
that one can best observe this development in Luther’s commentary on l 
Peter, where it is clear that the monk’s habit of his earlier work has been 
replaced by the evangelical garb of his later works. Here he speaks of the 
“priesthood of the baptised” and that fidelity and love are the fruit of faith. The 
internality of faith is the driving force for the externality of good works (LW 
40:148, 44:33). Ebeling (1977:178-197) illustrates this beautifully on the basis 
of the relationship between faith and love. Husband and wife are equal 
partners in the marriage in a holy covenant where respect and trust are 
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reciprocal: “Both should conduct themselves in such a way that the wife holds 
her husband in honor and that the husband, in turn, gives his wife the honor 
that is her due. If this were observed, peace and love would reign” (LW 30: l 
Pt 3:7). In this kind of relationship, the faithful are also basically without Law. 
This vocation makes the faithful in marriage, what Adam and Eve were 
supposed to be, free and joyous creatures of God on earth: 
 
Therefore, those who are married should be cheerful and confident 
and grateful to God that they are in an estate which has been 
ordained and blessed by God, of sure hope and assurance that 
God will keep his ordinance and blessing, regardless of whether it 
annoys the devil, the pope in Rome, and therefore prompts them to 




5. THE RELATIONAL AND ANALOGOUS MATRIX OF 
MARRIAGE 
It is striking that Luther time and again shifted marriage from the sixth (man 
and wife) to the fourth (parent and child) commandment. Although Lazareth 
(1994:255) may be right in saying that what is happening here, is about the 
former monk who could more comfortably deal with family matters than with 
marital matters, this nevertheless accords with the ethics Luther upheld about 
marriage. As mentioned above, marriage as an ordinance of creation should 
be understood far more broadly and could even rather be typified as the 
household (Johnson 2005:129). Therefore it becomes a matter for society 
(coram hominibus). It is to the benefit of cities and countries (WL 45:44). But it 
is also more than that. It is also a reflection of the relationship between Christ 
and his church: “Granted that marriage is a figure of Christ and the church; yet 
it is not a divinely instituted sacrament, but invented by men in the church who 
are carried away by their ignorance of both the word and the thing” (LW 
36:95). It is sacred (coram Deo). In terms of the Divine vocation it must also in 
effect precisely express inner faith in the righteousness of Christ. In other 
words, it is about the double commandment to love that must materialise, or 
stated differently, God’s love for us which must be reflected to the world.  
 In his interpretation of Psalm 45 Luther drew an analogy of the marital 
relationship with the relationship of Christ and his church. He makes the 
following sensational statements:  
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These things are greater than human speech can present or our 
heart comprehend. Still it is represented faintly in marriage, where 
the supreme love of the bridegroom is for the bride, one faith, one 
body, and one mind. Between Christ and the church the relation is 
real, whereas in physical marriage we find only images and 
representations of tiffs [sic] spiritual marriage, where Christ is the 
bridegroom and everything He has He gives to the church 
 
(LW 12: Ps 45:10) 
 
Now it is clear from this that marriage is a faint representation of the actual 
relationship between Christ and his church. It has already been shown that 
Luther could go along with Augustine’s understanding of marriage, though to 
him it was also a sacrament. The fact that it was a “visible sign of an invisible 
grace” was sufficient for Luther (LW 3: Gn 17:7). Augustine naturally did not 
know about the mediaeval “sanctification” element of the sacrament. Instead, 
he formulated the ex opere operato notion of the sacrament in contrast to the 
Donatists who did not want to recognise the sacraments where the so-called 
traditores served it and consequently developed a theory of ex opere 
operationis. Therefore, according to the Donatists, the administrator of the 
sacrament is decisive to the working of the sacrament. Augustine rejected this 
(McGrath 2007:424-425). What Luther basically rebelled against, therefore, 
was marriage as a sacrament in the sense developed by the Scholastics, who 
understood it to mean that it existed in its own right. In other words, the sign 
(signum) is released from the thing (res) and is presented as absolute. Stated 
differently, marriage now becomes presented ontologically as existing in itself. 
The sign becomes the thing itself. Consequently the three-part classification of 
subject – sign – thing is reduced to the two-part classification of subject – 
object. In this way, not only is the matter (thing) lost, but also the dynamics of 
the context. Augustine (1997b:7.21) uses a special example in his De Civitate 
Dei to illustrate this case.  
Augustine recounts there the rite in honour of Liber, the god of liquids, 
semen and fertility. At that time in the Italian village of Lavinium, this month-
long festival reached its climax when the festival celebrants worshipped a 
man’s sexual organs to honour Liber. An image of the male sexual organs 
was displayed and brought into the square on a wagon. At the end of the 
festival, the matron of the community draped a laurel crown around it with the 
intention of showing the highest honour to fertility. This deed was not even 
permitted in the theatres. And through this, Augustine now says, the gods 
were multiplied in the thoughts of the impure hearts. Where we deal here with 
the physical castration of the penis, we are really dealing with the castration of 
the sign, Ticciati (2007:165) asserts in her excellent analysis of this narrative. 
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Here Augustine wants to make a theological judgment about the prostitution of 
idolatry where the metaphorical statements about God became lost and your 
god became that on which you set your heart. That is why it is so important to 
perceive the thing behind the sign. Otherwise we will not come to God and 
remain one-dimensionally captive in our consumerist world. In summary, only 
in relationships does marriage exist for Luther too. For this reason he can say 
that marriage is a “type of Christ and the church” (LW 1: Ef 5:32), a “figure of 
Christ and the church” (LW 36:95, a “symbol of this great sacrament or 
mystery in Christ and the church” (LW 41:164) and a “kind of outward 
allegory” (LW 36:94). 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Marriage is for Luther an institution which is therefore simultaneously worldly 
and sacred. It is secular because it is an ordinary earthly institution and in no 
way carries a sacramental meaning. It also goes back to the creation of the 
first man and woman, when God led Adam and Eve to each other by the hand 
as it were and gave them to each other. But it is also sacred because it is an 
ordinance of creation and was therefore instituted by God self. Yet it does not 
sustain faith nor does it prepare human beings for eternal life as a sacrament 
does, but is merely the fruit of people whom God has declared righteous in 
faith. This dialectical view of marriage – law and gospel – on the one hand 
eliminated the Canon Law of the time, and on the other hand placed marriage 
in the greater context of God’s relationship with creation, in particular as a 
foreshadowing of Christ’s relationship with the church. It is important that this 
double movement should be held continuously in a dialectical tension with 
each other. The moment that one movement is relinquished, the other 
becomes absolutised. We can illustrate this on the basis of Emil Brunner who 
took the movement of the ordinance of creation to an extreme, and then again 
on the basis of Karl Barth who developed the spiritualisation of marriage to 
unacceptable extremes. 
Emil Brunner develops a theologia naturalis on the grounds of Luther’s 
declericalisation of marriage, which would eventually bring him in stark 
contrast with Barth’s revelationary theology. He supports Luther’s ordinances 
of creation and describes them as implanted in the nature of every person so 
that everyone instinctively knows God’s ordinances. This fits in with God’s 
creation (Brunner 1939:329). Sin did not abolish it and the sinful human 
remains aware of these ordinances. This ordinance of creation is as it were 
the wisdom of God to compel people who have been separated from one 
another, to have fellowship (Brunner 1939:194). In this way, the ordinance of 
creation is a natural instrument for placing human beings in fellowship and 
nurturing expectations about them. Therefore Brunner bases monogamy on 
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this. Man, wife and child form the natural relationship of meaningful existence 
(Brunner 1939:330). Natural love is therefore monistic and directed at the 
opposite sex6 (Brunner 1939:334).  
 Karl Barth would like to take this second movement of Luther’s to its 
logical conclusion. Since the covenant is the internal foundation of creation, 
creation only comes fully into its own in the creation of the woman in Genesis 
2 and the person who stands in relation to his/her equal (Barth 1970:337). 
Now this makes human beings multiple or pluralistic: “Er ist jetzt ein Pluralis” 
(Barth 1970:352). However, for him it is nothing other than the prefiguring of 
the relationship between Christ and his church (Barth 1970:373). With this, he 
explains faith in creation as the extrapolation of faith in salvation. Creation’s 
esse verum et bonum is concrete and real for the first time in Christ. This 
implies that the reconciliatory creation is the real creation first, and the initial 
creation is therefore uncompleted and unreal. The question can now justifiably 
be asked whether Barth did not assume that the relationship between creation 
and reconciliation was teleological rather than analogous? The implication is 
vast: creation is not merely an illustration of reconciliation, but in fact the proof 
of it! Or stated differently, “sign” and “thing” are inverted: creation becomes 
the significare and reconciliation the esse. With this, marriage becomes 
spiritualised and is made into something it is not. Luther’s demythologising 
now augers a remythologising. On the basis of probably the poorest 
exegetical exercise in his entire Kirchliche Dogmatik, Barth (1970:368) now 
argues that the creation of woman took place solely for the sake of the 
reconciliatory death of the Son: taking the rib from Adam’s side indicates the 
blood that flowed from the crucified Jesus’ side and resulted in his church! In 
the same way that Luther performed a double action on marriage by first 
secularising it and afterwards declaring it to be sacred again; Barth took the 
last-mentioned action to extremes and unfortunately allowed the first 
movement to vanish into the sand. Barth states, “coitus without co-existence” 
is a demonic matter, but unfortunately ends in co-existence without coitus.  
 In conclusion, it seems justifiable to say that Luther offers us a 
sociological perspective of marriage. He presents a tertium datur for a 
reduced physiological individualism and a spiritualised abstraction. In Luther’s 
theology, Law and Gospel can be as little divided from each other as the 
crucifixion and the resurrection can be understood without each other. 
 
                                                     
6 One could deduce from this that the ordinance of creation leaves no room for the 
homosexually oriented person. The yardstick is the purpose of creation and for this reason, 
homosexuality is contrary to nature. 
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